

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 18, 2013

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending October 18, 2013

Lapse in Appropriations: The site reps reviewed SRR's *Emergency Exception for Avoidance of Imminent Harm* and SRNS's *Contingency Action Plan*, which described their proposed scope of work and staffing levels if the appropriations lapse continued. While these plans were not invoked, they will be kept in case they are needed in the future. SRR employees will return to work on Monday. SRR will be using a Management Control Plan in conjunction with several staff briefings and management field observations to support their resumption of activities in their nuclear facilities. While SRNS employees were not furloughed, SRNS will need to resume operations in their facilities. SRNS will do this in a controlled manner with oversight by the Facility Evaluation Board. While very little budget information for FY14 is available yet, the preliminary information indicates that many of the funding challenges encountered last year will continue.

HB-Line: Engineers completed their evaluation of measured air flow rates using the alternate air purge and compared these rates to that predicted by their model. SRNS measured the airflows for the 10 (of 15) tanks with the shortest times (i.e., 1.6 to 8.3 hours) to reach the lower flammability limit if normal purge was lost. While some of the measured airflows were much lower (up to 92%) than that predicted by the model, all of the measured values were still at least 19 times greater than the minimum airflow needed to provide adequate dilution.

L-Area: During a review of the completed procedure for a disassembly basin inventory, the facility manager discovered that the basin first line manager (BFLM) had not initialed a criticality safety verification step. In addition, the BFLM signed the procedure authenticating that the procedure was completed when in fact it was not fully completed until the next day.

K-Area Material Storage (KAMS): SRNS declared a PISA for KAMS when they discovered that the thermal analysis for the storage arrays includes the maximum heat loading for 9975 containers (19 watts), but not for 9977 containers (24 watts). (See 10/11/13 report.) This week the site rep sat in on an issue review where the facility determined the cause of the incident. The inputs and assumptions for the current documented safety analysis are out of date and are buried in a calculation. This reflects the fact that the KAMS DSA has not been subject to an upgrade effort like some other DSAs at SRS. Operations and engineering management are aware of the limitations of the KAMS DSA.

F-Tank Farm: SRR has entered the 30-day grace period for obtaining corrosion control samples for Tanks 4, 8, and 46. Engineering is working to extend these dates based upon past history.

H-Tank Farm: Recently, the transfer line connecting Tanks 38 and 43 with the H-Area Diversion Box 7 failed a helium pressure test of the jacket. SRR has not identified the cause of this failure yet because of the furlough.